Postrel (2009) presents strategies being used by organizations in trying to shorten the donor waiting lists. Both paired exchanges and donor chains are used to increase the number of donors available to kidney transplants’ potential recipients. Paired exchanges allow incompatible donors to find compatible recipients through a pair of donors and recipients who will both benefit the kidney recipients. However, this strategy can only reduce the waiting list so far plus its economic limitations bar its effectiveness.
Although donor chains provide better chances for waiting recipients to receive compatible donors, it still has no capacity to elevate the increasing waiting list. As such Postrel (2009) proposes the need for compensation and financial incentives for donors in order to increase the number of kidney donors. In addition to this, these factors would reduce the financial expenses incurred by long dialysis patients. This paper seeks to present an economic argument in favor of Postrel’s argument. Among the aspects to be discussed include the justification for compensations using the demand and supply analysis, using the concept that compensation and financial incentives can reduce expenditures and increase overall economic benefits. Furthermore, this strategy would work towards crippling transplant tourism which is costing the nation hefty millions of dollars. It is also important to acknowledge that such a system will only function advantageously if it is well regulated. With such a system in place its accrued advantages will definitely overshadow any arguments against them.
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